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This paper presents a case study of a local school network in England that is 
well-established as a provider of pre-service teacher education. School networks 
are now the favoured providers of Initial Teacher Education (ITE) in England in 
a ‘school-led’ system. Our evidence comes from participant observation and 
interviews conducted over a five-month period (more than 400 hours of data 
collection).  We present evidence of the strategic intent and enactment of this 
programme. The policy of ‘school-led’ ITE has been directed by statements 
suggesting that governance will operate through local networks. However, we 
also observe the impact of hierarchical and market governance. We review this 
evidence in terms of interactions between hierarchies, markets and networks and 
use this review to reflect on the discourse that has driven policy and the discourse 
that has resisted this policy direction in England.   
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This paper presents a case study of a local school network in England that is 
well-established as a provider of pre-service teacher education. School networks 
are now the favoured providers of Initial Teacher Education (ITE) in England in 
a ‘school-led’ system. Our evidence comes from participant observation and 
interviews conducted over a five-month period (more than 400 hours of data 
collection).  We present evidence of the strategic intent and enactment of this 
programme. The policy of ‘school-led’ ITE has been directed by statements 
suggesting that governance will operate through local networks. However, we 
also observe the impact of hierarchical and market governance. We review this 
evidence in terms of interactions between hierarchies, markets and networks and 
use this review to reflect on the discourse that has driven policy and the discourse 
that has resisted this policy direction in England.   
ITE Introduction  
Since 2010, education policy in England shifted Initial Teacher Education (IITE) 
towards a ‘school-led’ system with an emphasis on an apprenticeship model. The term 
‘school-led’ draws attention to the locus of decision-making in schools rather than 
higher education (HE). An HE-led ITE system may involve substantial ‘school-based’ 
experience (or ‘practicum’) for pre-service teachers (PSTs). What has changed in this 
school-led system is the way that the ITE is governed: who has control of how it is 
provided and how this control is exercised. The post-2010 system has favoured 
governance through networks of schools and this study offers an in-depth case study of 
one school network. The paper offers an analysis of this change in the context of what 
may be expected of the operation of hierarchies, markets and networks in the provision 
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of ITE. Debate over education policy sometimes treats these governance systems as 
simple alternatives. But in practice, policy simply changes the scope for each system 
(Davies, 2018) and that is the perspective followed in our analysis. Using an in-depth 
case study of one school network, we aim to contribute to theoretical debate that can 
inform the future of policy on ITE.   
The paper begins with a brief summary of the narratives of recent policy change 
towards ITE. This commentary concentrates on England, but notes points of comparison 
with trends elsewhere in the world. The following section provides a detailed 
descriptive account which sets the development of one school network in the context of 
changing policy towards ITE in England. This is followed by a method section that 
explains the rationale for this study and describes data collection and analysis. The 
results section is divided into two parts. The first of these focuses on the strategic intent 
of the ITE programme in this case study. The second focuses on the operation of the 
programme. The discussion section considers how the study adds to the literature on the 
roles of schools and HEIs in the provision of ITE. It does so through setting the case 
study in the context of interactions between modes of governance. Ball & Junemann 
(2012) suggested that education should be analysed in terms of the mix of governance 
through hierarchy, markets and networks. A focus on interactions also aims to capture 
dynamic processes by which each mode of governance changes the way in which other 
modes operate. The conclusion comments on some implications for the design of policy 
on ITE and, in particular, on the development of school-led ITE. 
 
Networks for the provision of Pre-Service Teacher Education 
This section outlines the changing roles of hierarchies, markets and networks in the 
provision of ITE in England. As in other countries (Sachs, 2001), these changes have 
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been portrayed by two opposing narratives which make contrasting assumptions about 
the motivations of teacher educators and the locus of powerful knowledge. 
The narrative that directed policy change drew heavily on the ‘new public 
management’(NPM) (Brignall and Modell, 2000) which assumed that HEIs and teacher 
educators would tend to act in their own interests rather than the interests of pupils and 
society. Therefore, these institutions and professionals had to be constrained by 
regulation and competition to make them more cost-efficient (Christensen and Laegreid, 
2001). This narrative justified regulation on the grounds that outcomes needed to be 
clearly defined and comparable, whilst presuming that government had the capacity to 
undertake this task in the best interest of society. This theme in the narrative promotes 
hierarchical governance exercised by central government and it has been prominent in 
the direction of policy towards teacher education around the globe (see for example, 
Storey, 2006; Department for Education, 2011; Rowe and Skourdoumbis, 2019). Whilst 
the apparatus of hierarchical control has remained, the focus of the narrative in England 
since 2010 has shifted to giving control to local networks of schools (Mutton, Burn and 
Menter, 2017).  This policy change was justified by a claim that schools rather than HE 
held the powerful knowledge necessary for PSTs (Gove, 2010).  
The narrative trusts that governments can use contracting to reconcile a desire to 
exert hierarchical control with a devolution of governance to local school networks. In a 
contracting model the government delegates responsibility for provision to ‘for-profit’ 
or ‘not-for-profit’ organisations that are required to deliver contractual outcomes in 
return for payments from government (Pugh, Davies and Adnett, 2009; Lodge and 
Hood, 2012). The English government concluded that it was not able to make the ITE 
system work through contracts with HEIs, but does believe it can work with schools. 
This is consistent with a simple transfer of market thinking to teacher education: 
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powerful knowledge about teaching is generated by competing providers (of school 
education) in pursuit of advantage over others (Kirzner, 1997).  It also chimed with the 
arguments of academics (e.g. Hargreaves, 1999; Lieberman, 2000) and headteachers 
(e.g. Berwick, 2004) who located powerful knowledge in schools and school networks. 
This belief is questioned by those (e.g. McNamara et al., 2017, Mincu, 2015) who doubt 
the capacity of schools and school networks to match the powerful knowledge they 
believe is located in HEIs  
Since 2010, policy has pursued a contracting narrative through a dramatic 
increase in the proportion of schools designated as ‘academies’. These schools are free 
from local authority control and operate as autonomous organisations or networks of 
organisations, though largely dependent on government contracts for their income. 
Advocacy of school networks in England (e.g. Hill, 2011; Matthews and Berwick, 
2013) has claimed that these networks will be motivated by a ‘moral imperative’ in the 
public interest. This belief directly contradicts the assumption of self-interest that has 
driven NPM and the contracting model. It also overlooks the way in which the 
contracting model has opened the provision of schooling and teacher education to 
individuals, organisations and networks whose experience, beliefs and practices are 
rooted in fields beyond education (Ball and Junemann, 2012; Zeichner and Pena-
Sandoval, 2015; Ellis et al., 2019). The narrative also discounts unintended 
consequences by assuming that all desirable outcomes can be measured and that 
contracts will be sufficiently closed to keep providers acting in the public interest (Hood 
and Peters, 2004). For example, Hood and Dixon (2013) reported that expectations that 
NPM would result in cost reductions across the public sector were not fulfilled. This 
general result is mirrored in the case of ITE. The NAO (2016) found that HE-led ITE 
provided the cheapest alternative.  
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An opposing narrative regards teacher educators in HEIs as representatives of 
the teaching profession, committed to act in the best interests of pupils and the societies 
to which these pupils belong. This narrative presumes that HEIs inducted PSTs into a 
shared set of values and prepared them to act independently in the complex situations 
they would encounter as teachers. It also presumes that HEIs are best placed to give 
PSTs access to powerful knowledge that will empower them to act as independent 
professionals (Brown et al., 2016). This view of a professional network was labelled 
‘democratic professionalism’ by Sachs (2001) and elsewhere has been described as 
‘occupational professionalism’ (Hoyle, 1974; Matthews, 1991; Bullough, 2011; Evans, 
2011). The narrative of democratic professionalism regrets the erosion of governance 
through HE professional networks resulting from government encouragement of 
competition between providers, increasing the scope for market forces (Brown, 2018). 
The narrative concludes that NPM has replaced democratic professionalism serving the 
public interest by managerial or organisational professionalism serving the interests of 
organisations (Evetts, 2009).   
An important variant of this second narrative (e.g. Zeichner, 2012; Mutton et al., 
2018) accepts the assumption of teacher educators’ public service motivation but rejects 
any claim that HEIs have privileged access to powerful knowledge. This hybrid 
narrative desires a reconfiguration of networks of teacher educators and teachers which 
recognise, value and build complementary powerful knowledge through collaborations 
between HEIs and schools. A focus on relationships between networks tends to abstract 





The development of policy and the development of this case of school-led Pre-
Service Teacher Education 
Excellent guides to the development of ITE policy in England are available elsewhere 
(e.g. Brown, 2018; McNamara et al., 2017; Whiting et al., 2019). This section aims to 
position the network of schools in this case study within the complex web of provision 
for teacher education which evolved.  It also aims to highlight ways in which 
interactions between hierarchy, networks and markets shaped this case. 
Opportunities for groups of schools to form a partnership for teacher training in 
England were created in the early 1990s (DfE, 1992, 1993). These partnerships 
provided ‘School Centred Initial Teacher Training’ and were referred to as ‘SCITTs’. 
The schools in this case study formed  a SCITT was formed in 1993, placing them in 
the vanguard of this new initiative. By 2000, only 1.5% of teacher training places were 
provided by SCITTs (Bailey and Robson, 2002). By the time that primary data were 
collected for this case study (2013-14), SCITTs accounted for 6-7% of training places 
and this rose to 13% in 2017 (DfE, 2017).  
This case study focuses on secondary schools in a suburban area of a large city. 
The proportion of disadvantaged pupils in the locality was close to the national average 
and there was no difference between the proportion of disadvantaged pupils in the 
SCITT schools in this case study and in other schools in the locality. This network was 
also an early adopter of a school-based ‘employed route’ to qualified teacher status (the 
Graduate Teachers’ Programme or GTP)  introduced in 1998.  Individuals recruited on 
this route received a salary from the school (heavily subsidised by government) during 
their training, prior to ‘certification’. This scheme grew more rapidly than the SCITT 
programme and by 2005, employment-based routes into teaching accounted for roughly 
a fifth of all ITT places in England and Wales (Smith and McLay, 2007).  
9 
 
A pivotal moment in England arrived with the election of a coalition 
government in 2010 and a Secretary of State for Education who was committed to 
school networks and an apprenticeship model for ITT (Gove, 2010). The idea of 
‘Teaching schools’ as beacons of good practice’ located the apprenticeship model in 
institutions rather than individual mentors.  Teaching schools would act as leaders of 
school networks, which became known as ‘Teaching School Alliances’ (TSAs). Within 
the case study SCITT, one school (TS) became a Teaching School.  At the time of the 
primary data collection for the case study, the TSA only included secondary schools 
within the SCITT. By 2017 the TSA also included 4 primary schools and a private 
teacher development company that was originally set up as a spin-off from the work of 
one of the SCITT schools. There was, therefore, huge overlap between the SCITT and 
the TSA although the organisation of these two networks was led by different schools.  
An evaluation of the early years of TSAs (Gu et al., 2014) reported that the 
quality of ITT provided by these networks was regarded by schools as an important 
incentive to join the TSA. Within two years of the start of the programme, 1 in every 10 
schools had joined a TSA (Matthews and Berwick, 2013). These TSAs were connected 
through a national network, encouraging a sense that knowledge about teachers’ 
professional development could, and should, be shared between them. Matthews and 
Berwick (2013) also reported that more than two thirds of TSAs were using a teacher 
development programme that had been developed by and marketed from a school that 
was a long-standing member of a SCITT.  
In 2012/13 the government introduced a new route into teaching referred to as 
‘School Direct’. This programme intended to shift the leadership of ITT from 
universities to schools to a much greater extent than had been achieved through the 
SCITT schemes. The establishment and growth of TSAs provided a realistic platform 
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for achieving this objective and within two years School Direct accounted for 30% of 
all ITT recruitment (Davies et al., 2016). School Direct took two forms. Some trainees 
were recruited on a ‘salaried route’. This option was only available to applicants with at 
least 3 years’ employment experience and replaced the earlier GTP. Starters on this 
route began the year as ‘non-certified teachers’ receiving a salary determined by the 
school and gained certification on successful completion. Schools providing this route 
received a government grant which covered a substantial proportion of the trainee’s 
salary. Other School Direct trainees followed a ‘tuition fees’ route. In 2013/14 the 
SCITT was allocated 36 secondary ITT places and led by school SC2. In the same year 
School TS was awarded 26 School Direct salaried and 16 School Direct tuition fee 
places.  
The SCITT in this case study has had a stable membership of 8-9 secondary 
schools, providing a context in which trust between network members had space in 
which to grow. School SC2 has acted as the nominated lead for the SCITT for the last 
10 years. Governance was vested in a consortium board comprised of the headteachers 
of participating schools. Seven of the schools were located in one local education 
authority within a 5-mile radius of school SC2. In total there were 55 secondary schools 
in this locality, of which 20% were private schools. The network of schools which 
formed the SCITT was competing with many other schools: to attract teachers as well 
as to attract pupils. An inspection report in 2006 on the quality of ITT provided by the 
SCITT asserted that the SCITT had been created ‘in response to teacher shortages’. 
Later inspections in 2009 and 2015 rated the quality of ITT provided by the SCITT as 
‘outstanding’. This network was mature, stable and judged as high performing.  
The SCITT and TSA may be described as a ‘loose-knit’ network (Bauman, 
2001; Davies, 2018): focused on one aspect of the life of the participating schools each 
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of which had its separate governing board. Other school networks that have been 
fostered by recent policy have been more ‘tight-knit’: sharing a governance structure 
and in some cases developing a common ‘brand’ (Chapman, 2015). Within the locality 
of the SCITT (within 5 miles of School SC2), there were schools belonging to three 
‘Multi-academy trusts’ which were sponsored by organisations responsible for running 
a chain of schools. This case study aims to capture a picture of the work of a network of 
schools at a particular point in time in a journey that is continuing. The structure of the 
school partnership is portrayed in Figure 1. 
 
Insert figure 1 about here. 
This section ends with a summary of how policy has placed schools in England at the 
heart of two related and unresolved tensions arising from interactions between 
hierarchical, market and network governance. The first tension for teaching has been 
created through advocacy of school accountability and autonomy (Evans, 2011). In 
common with other countries such as Australia (Tatto and Menter, 2019), successive 
governments have assumed that they can improve initial teacher education by setting 
and monitoring common standards for the process and outcomes of ITE (West, Mattei 
and Roberts, 2011). However, promotion of school-led ITE has been justified in the last 
decade by an appeal to the value of local school, practical, knowledge (Gove, 2010; 
Childs, 2013). This implies approval of  a localised conceptions of ‘the good teacher’ 
which became internal to particular school networks (Maandag et al., 2007, Hordern, 
2014), that depart from national inspection of a standards in ITE. There is, therefore, a 
tension between contrasting models of mentoring in ITE: competence or apprenticeship 
(Furlong et al., 2000; Beauchamp et al., 2015; Mutton et al., 2018). Mentoring 
competence assumes the generality of standards whilst mentoring apprentices declares 
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the primacy of acquiring local practical knowledge.  
A second tension has been created by policy expectations regarding the benefits of 
competition in markets and collaboration in school networks (Furlong, 2005). Policy 
emphasis on the importance of school accountability has been justified by belief that 
competition between schools will incentivise them to improve in relation to common 
standards. In the context of ITE, competitive pressures have been described as ‘an 
existential threat’ to the participation of HEIs in ITE (Maguire & George, 2017; Brown, 
2018). Whilst schools also compete to recruit PSTs, they are more concerned with using 
ITE as a means of competing with other schools to recruit teachers (White, Dickerson 
and Weston., 2015; Davies et al., 2016; McNamara, Murray & Phillips, 2017). 
However, policy in England (e.g. DfE, 2010) began to place increasing reliance on 
school networks to secure improvements in teacher quality and pupil attainment. 
Schools have also reported benefits for staff development of providing ITE (McNamara, 
Murray & Phillips, 2017). Insofar as this is carried out through networks it exemplifies 
collaboration whilst conflicting with competition. As schools have grappled with these 
tensions they have developed practices and ideas that have influenced the direction of 
policy: shaping what is deemed possible and desirable.  
 
Method 
Research questions  
In the light of our review of literature we designed a study to address the 
following questions: 
1. What can we discern about motivation and approach to powerful 
knowledge in one well-established school network providing ITE 
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• through the design and intent of the programme? 
• through the enactment of the programme? 
2. To what extent can we discern interactions between governance through 
hierarchy, markets and networks in the design and operation of this 
programme? 
Rationale for the case study 
This school network was chosen for the case study because it was a well-established 
school network providing ITT which was graded as outstanding by inspectors. It should 
exemplify mature provision that shows what this form of organisation is capable of 
offering. The ethnographic approach and the timescale (5 months) were designed to 
allow trust to be developed so that the data collection could probe participants and 
processes and offer a fair account of operations and the thinking behind those 
operations.  
The scope of the case study 
This case study focuses on the School Direct (SD) route into teaching as it was enacted 
within this network of schools. This scheme shared a central programme (of sessions 
run by teachers within the scheme) with the pre-service teachers (PSTs) following other 
routes into teaching within the SCITT. These sessions are referred to as ‘training 
sessions’. The data collection focused on the TS as this school was directly responsible 
for SD scheme. Data were also collected from other schools in the TSA/SCITT network 
which shared the responsibility for mentoring trainees. Some interview data were also 




Data were collected over a 5-month period during which one of the authors 
visited network schools three or four days of every week (more than 400 hours overall). 
Two methods were used: participant observation and interviews with key informants. 
Participants were observed on numerous occasions in meetings to plan the provision, 
mentor training, formal sessions conducted with groups of PSTs, one-to-one mentoring 
and shadowing individual PSTs. The interview schedules were informed by the 
observations and associated field notes. Overall, 21 interviews were conducted: SCITT 
operational management (scheme manager and programme co-ordinator); 2 senior 
managers of the TS; 6 mentors (all based at the TS); department head at the TS; senior 
manager at one other school in the scheme; 3 SDS trainees; 5 trainees on other routes 
within the SCITT; newly qualified teacher at the TS who was on the SDS in the 
previous year. Each of these semi-structured interviews was transcribed and manually 
coded: themes emerged through a grounded theory approach, in which research 
questions informed the fieldwork.  
The non-UK researcher who gathered the data was based in a UK university on 
secondment. The use of substantial range of the observation data as well as interviews 
was designed to reduce the risk of data being limited by the perspective of the data 
collector. The research followed the ethical guidelines set out by BERA (2011). Actors 
were informed about the purposes of the study and participated voluntarily. They were 
informed of how research findings would be used and also their right to withdraw. Each 
school and participant was allocated a codename and files were stored securely using 
these codes. Field notes and interview transcripts were not disclosed to school leaders. 
A diary was kept during fieldwork with detailed daily notes. Two years after the study, 




These results focus on the Teaching School which led the School Direct provision. We 
divide the results into two main sections: those that relate to the strategic intent behind 
the design of the programme and those pertaining to the enactment or operation of the 
programme 
The strategic intent in the design of the programme 
Policy in England has expected school-led ITE to operate on the basis that the 
government commissions schools to provide training that conforms to set standards that 
are monitored by government inspectors (OfSTED). The standard arrangement is that 
one school has the contract with the government and this school then commissions other 
schools to provide classroom experience for PSTs. In this case, there is an intervening 
layer: the school (TS) with the contract commissions the SCITT (and its central team) to 
direct and manage the whole scheme. Any contracting scheme poses a problem for 
commissioners: how to avoid the provider (agent) pursuing its own agenda whilst 
providing a service that falls short of what the commissioner was expecting (quality-
shading).   
Since the outcomes from ITE are complex and hard to define it is not possible 
for government to prepare a ‘closed’ contract with schools that specifies exactly what 
they are being contracted to achieve. Hence, the reliance on inspection. A key problem 
here is that providers have strong incentives to do what they can to make it appear to 
inspectors that they achieving what the government wants even when the reality is 
somewhat different.  The inspection system required that an outstanding provider must 
not have any low performing (grade 3) trainees. One senior mentor (School SC1) 
reported “not [being] allowed now [by the provider] to have any grade 3 trainees” in 
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order to keep the outstanding provider status. The implication was that PSTs were being 
graded higher than the mentor’s professional judgement. Each of the interviewed PSTs 
also expressed strongly negative views about being denied the freedom to be critical in 
evaluation forms on the grounds that the provider was due an inspection. Preparation for 
this inspection was clearly effective as the partnership was judged ‘an outstanding 
provider’ in the following year.  
A commissioning model relies on competition between providers to foster 
efficiency. Senior managers at the TS did perceive themselves as being able to choose 
between alternative providers according to the terms that were offered. 
‘You see at the moment we have the [SCITT] … we could go to X [a university 
provider]… we could go to Y [another university provider] …We can do the 
training ourselves …sometimes when we get a bit frustrated with the 
[provider], we do have some plans’ (Senior Mentor SC1) 
 
The SCITT provider was also strongly aware of acting in a commissioning role in the 
allocation of training responsibilities. The SCITT programme co-ordinator spoke 
extensively about the effort that was demanded in securing provision in each partner 
school and endeavouring to make sure that the quality and type of provision conformed 
to their expectations. 
 
‘Effectively, building that network […] is the same as if you break into a new 
market and if you’re a company […] and [you have] to do a lot of phone calls, 
a lot of speaking to people one-to-one […] coaxing, coercive at certain stages 
and […] bringing people round to the way we work, because we work 
differently to how universities work’.  
 
‘Almost like being a […] contract manager […] with a big company, we’re 
going out and looking at customer relations, and spend quite a bit of time 
working with head teachers and senior mentors and mentors to make sure they 




Although the programme manager explicitly compared the SCITT to a private 
business they also spoke of managing network rather than hierarchical relationships: 
other schools within the partnership had to be persuaded rather than dictated to. Some 
resistance to the SCITT team’s efforts to impose a particular way of working is 
suggested in remarks from a school senior mentor: 
 
‘The [Provider] used to sort of dict[ate] […] saying “This is how you do it. 
We are the Provider, we are the awarding body, we are the ones [who] give 
you the qualified teacher status, [so] this is how you do it.”’ (Senior Mentor 
2, TS)   
 
Schools participating in the scheme also had to balance the demand on their 
resources (see Table 1).  As noted in an inspection report in 2006, securing an adequate 
supply of new teachers was a key motivator for schools’ participation in the SCITT. A 
subsequent inspection referred to the schools’ intention to ‘grow their own’ (teachers)i. 
Recruits to the salaried route, in particular, are expected to be ready to fulfil the 
demands of ‘being a teacher’ from the beginning of the year. In the words of the 
programme co-ordinator, PSTs will ‘experience what it means to be a teacher from day 
one’. The scheme also provided opportunities for professional development (through 
acting as mentors). Experienced teachers could gain promotion through demonstrating 
capacity to lead and develop others and through signalling their readiness to take on 
more responsibility and a higher workload. In the words of a government inspection 
report, the year after this study, ‘involvement in teacher training is built into the 
performance management of key staff in partnership schools and mentoring is seen as a 
career development opportunity’. There was a strong association within the partnership 




Table 1 about here 
 
The schools from the larger alliance provided mentors with formally specified 
responsibilities and teachers who supported PSTs on a more ad hoc basis. Since the 
PSTs on the salaried route were included in the school’s overall staffing, in principle, 
the school could increase its capacity to accept additional students (in which case there 
would be no offsetting reduction in workload as PSTs took responsibility for classes 
otherwise taught by experienced teachers). In practice, mentors generally believed they 
had experienced an increase in workload. One commented  
 
‘with the [Provider] they’re basically asking the school almost to provide the 
University’s support as well as the school support, so we’re doing two jobs” 
(Senior Mentor 3).  
 
The schools have to balance the gains they make by securing recruitment of new 
teachers with the capabilities and skills they are seeking against additional demands on 
current staff. If current staff regard these demands as enhancing their career prospects 
they are more likely to stay, if they perceive their job circumstances as getting worse 
they are more likely to leave. At the time of this study the network appeared to have 
been successful in developing a culture in which the additional work had become an 
established norm which was associated with career progression. 
‘I am on site probably for 12 hour a day five days a week and then I go home 
and do quite a lot of work and prep. on top of that …so …but is just built in 
it, just used to work but that’s the expectation and what's you …..teachers 
coming into the profession is what they say, is modelled to them so they don't 
know any different.’(Subject Mentor TS, interview) 
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The enactment of the ITT programme 
The accounts from scheme managers, mentors and PSTs were consistent in suggesting a 
concerted and coherent effort to promote particular practices in teaching and in training 
new teachers. The team employed by the SCITT to manage the scheme try to secure 
adherence within the scheme to their (SCITT) interpretation of the generalised criteria 
set out by govern inspectors. This involved working with mentors to move from an 
initial variation of opinion to an acceptance of a common view. 
 
what newly qualified teachers need to know when they get into their schools, 
not just about the knowledge, but the skills, the understanding, and the 
changes that are occurring in education quite rapidly […] so [we] sit down 
and really plan that out and everybody has an opinion and now there seem to 
be more and more senior mentors attending, it does become difficult: you have 
different opinions from different schools (Senior Mentor SC1, interview) 
 
The training programme was designed to address the full range of issues 
identified by inspectors as necessary for outstanding practice. For example, teaching 
pupils with English as a second language was given a prominent place in the central 
training programme, although PSTs regarded this as unnecessary since most of them 
believed they had not encountered pupils with English as a second language in their 
teaching.  
 
‘like EA, we had 3 or 4 sessions on that.. then we had a day we had to go to 
another school quite far away …which was just pointless…and then think 
throughout this year I haven’t encountered one of EAL child’. (SCITT trainee, 
focus group) 
 
According to national data at the time of the study, the average proportion of 
secondary school pupils with English as a second language was about 14% (DfE, 2014). 
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There was a tension between the generalised view of knowledge for teaching that was 
promoted in the central programme and the specific and localised nature of PSTs’ 
classroom experience.  Teaching practices were promoted on the basis that these would 
be approved by inspectors (DfE, 2011): e.g. beginning with a ‘starter activity’; using a 
variety of resources; differentiating between the needs of students by providing different 
tasks for different abilities; not leaping in with the right answer when students did not 
immediately understand).  
The focus of the preparation provided by the scheme was on practice rather than 
principle. For example, one PST referred to the justification they believed had been 
offered for ‘personalised teaching’: 
 
‘I don’t think it’s justified by theory, I think it's more by OFSTED they just 
say, this is what they are looking for, you know the teaching standards, like 
standard 6.’ (NQT, former SDS in the same school, interview) 
 
Other PSTs reported a similar emphasis on practice. 
 
‘we were often told, for example, … do this. There is no ……we want to hear 
some more justification for that, ‘cause we might disagree pedagogically with 
what they [are] saying or think that there is no evidence.’ (NQT, former SDS 
in the same school, interview) 
 
PSTs recalled that when theory had been invoked, evidence for the theory and 
alternatives to the theory were not considered. One PST claimed there had been an 
 
‘overemphasis of Bloom’s taxonomy, as to be an end of absolutely everything 
... and nobody ever questions the limits or different approaches or different 
methods …in one training session someone asked a question and there was 
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“oh no, no, no”…. we could not think about ourselves or outside this box.’ 
(SCITT trainee, focus group) 
 
Monitoring of progress focused on adherence to specific practice rather than 
finding out how PSTs justified what they were doing and what they expected the impact 
of their practice to be. This was observed through mentors checking that the teacher was 
following practice required in the scheme that learning objectives were shown on the 
front cover of pupils’ books and that pupils’ books had been marked at least once during 
the last two weeks.  
Observation of a planning meeting for the following year’s programme provided 
insights into how teachers are identified as having the generalizable knowledge to lead 
the central sessions. The principal criterion used was whether teachers had been 
identified as ‘outstanding’ on through evaluations of their classroom practice. These 
individuals were expected to be able to design and conduct sessions (without further 
training or mentoring) on the basis of their outstanding teaching. This criterion aligns 
well with a belief that PSTs need to be trained by successful practitioners, but it also 
assumes that ‘successful’ practice is rooted in generalizable knowledge that the 
outstanding teacher is not only able to articulate but also able to help others to engage 
with. One senior mentor worried about being ‘listed’ as a speaker in a session without 
being informed. He felt able to handle the topic of differentiation as a teacher in his own 
classroom, but not as a trainer of young adults, clearly identifying a difference between 
these roles. He was convinced that an expert trainer, from a university, local authority or 
other body, would have been a better solution.  
 
“I think it is a big ask to expect teachers and deputies to suddenly step up to 
be speakers for 30 graduates next year […] In theory, we are supposed to be 
experts in lesson planning. But it’s a big ask to then think I have got to deliver 
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This study has examined the operation of what might be described as a ‘micro-
network’: a fairly small group of schools. This size of network is currently fairly typical 
of school networks in England. Networks also operate at ‘meso-levels’. These may be 
observed in national co-ordination of ‘Teaching Schools’ (Matthews & Berwick, 2012) 
or the networks of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Ball & Junemann (2012; McNamara, Murray 
& Phillips, 2017; Mutton et al., 2018). Finally, there are macro-level networks operating 
through cultural capital which allows people to connect through language, knowledge 
and taken-for-granted beliefs.  
 
Previous studies of education policy in England (e.g. Brown et al., 2016) have 
noted a tension between accountability (centralisation) and autonomy (de-
centralisation). The framing of this study has aimed to highlight ways in which this 
plays out through interactions between governance by hierarchy, markets and networks. 
The contracting model that has shaped policy in England tries to resolve this tension 
through markets: such that more effective providers signal their quality through the way 
they use autonomy to outperform competitors. 
This case study has portrayed a micro-network of schools that has achieved 
sustained success in the context of these struggles (as indicated by stable membership of 
the network, outstanding rating in government inspections of teacher education, and 
securing new contracts for ITE). And yet it does not seem to epitomise the vision of an 
empowered local school network that has been depicted by policy (Gove, 2010; 
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Department for Education, 2016). The network was driven by the need to adhere to 
government standards and to secure praise from government inspectors. The network 
depends on contracts from central government for its income from ITE. It directs its 
activity to ensure that these contracts are renewed: not least through achieving high 
grades in government inspections. PSTs reported that they had been discouraged from 
including critical comments in their evaluations. It appeared that the network’s anxiety 
to please inspectors resulted in losing the opportunity to improve through responding to 
the voice of PSTs. Nonetheless, the network’s concern with judgements from inspectors 
had encouraged them to organise experiences (e.g. in relation to teaching students with 
English as a second language) that prepare PSTs to teach in schools that are different 
from any in the network. However, this was proving insufficient to convince PSTs on 
the programme that these experiences were worthwhile. The network was motivated by 
a desire to use ITE to improve its competitiveness in the struggle to recruit the teachers 
it wanted.  It has evolved to the extent of network managers openly referring to the 
network as a business seeking a larger share of the market. The appeal of school 
networks in the governance of ITE was fostered by a belief that these networks would 
be motivated by public service. But the pressures of hierarchy and markets on this 
network appears to have re-directed motivation. It is, therefore, not realistic to assume 
that autonomy will necessary be used for public good (even when actors believe that it 
is? what they are doing). 
The appeal of network governance has been fostered by recognition of the 
power of local knowledge and a presumption of public service motivation. But no 
network operates in a vacuum. Hierarchical and market pressures have deeply affected 




We turn now to the conflicting claims for ownership of powerful knowledge for 
ITE. The schools in this case study worked together in a ‘loose-knit’ network (Bauman, 
2001) in that that each school maintained its independent governing body and they 
collaborated specifically in the provision of ITE. Nonetheless, there was an ongoing 
battle for control of the definitions of ‘good teaching’ and ‘good ITE’. The central 
SCITT team sought to impose hierarchical control within the network and this was 
resisted by some school mentors. This kind of tension within an organisation has 
received considerable attention in the literature on business where ‘rational strategy’, 
imposing hierarchical order, is contrasted with emergent strategy that devolves 
responsibility to frontline workers (Mintzberg, 1994). The same tension is addressed in 
the literature on schools, not least in references to ‘distributed leadership’ (Spillane, 
Diamond and Jita., 2003). This tension hinges on claims to possession of powerful 
knowledge. In this case, the central SCITT team claimed ownership of the correct 
interpretation of the expectations of government inspectors. So Hordern’s (2014) 
expectation that local school networks would develop distinctive views of what counts 
as ‘good teaching’ were not fulfilled. Although the rhetoric accompanying the post 2010 
policy stressed the value of schools’ knowledge, the practice in this case was shaped by 
adherence to the knowledge claims of government. The schools did adopt an 
apprenticeship model (Gove, 2010), but there was quite limited scope for mentors to 
dictate the practice that PSTs were expected to adhere to. 
There appears to be an inherent contradiction in the contracting model’s 
response to the public choice critique (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). The public choice 
critique argued (i) that governments and their employees act as much out of self-interest 
as for-profit companies and (ii) that they are too remote from provision of goods and 
services to have reliable knowledge. Therefore, government should not provide services 
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through hierarchical control but should rely on market forces. The contracting model 
accepts the argument against government provision but claims that governments should 
commission services from private providers. But in order to draw up a contract with a 
provider a government must presume to know what should be provided and how to 
check whether a provider is operating in an efficient manner. Education Ministers in 
England since 2010 have proclaimed that schools know best and then told schools what 
to do (Gove, 2010; Department for Education, 2016). As noted by Mutton, Burn and 
Menter (2017), there are unresolved tensions in the policies being pursued on ITE. 
Conclusion 
This case study adds to the literature by shedding new light on the provision of ITE 
through networks of local schools. It concentrates on the nature and implications of 
network governance. The principal observation is that evaluation of policy change on 
ITE benefits from careful attention to interactions between hierarchical, market and 
network governance. Advocacy of network governance for ITE in England (e.g. Hill, 
2011; Matthews and Berwick, 2013) neglected the implications of pressures from 
hierarchical governance (from central government) and market governance (through the 
supply of teachers and competition with other schools). Successive policy shifts in 
England have encouraged network governance within the context of market governance 
whilst also retaining hierarchical governance by government. Interactions between these 
different forms of governance are inevitable. But when policy ignores these interactions 
it is bound to create problems. However valiant and well-intentioned schools may be, 
they are being asked to deal with a contradictory set of pressures.  
Research can add further to policy development and critique by attending 
carefully to the interactions between hierarchy, markets and networks. We are 
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conscious that our study has not referred to ways in which the voices of leaders of this 
network were formative in the development of national policy. We could not do so 
without compromising the anonymity of participants. Yet this is an important of the 
story of how interactions between hierarchies, markets and networks are dynamic. The 
field is not left settled.  
Our case study also suggests some possible consequences of school-led ITE for 
the future development of new teachers. If teachers are trained to perform in particular 
circumstances this may create problems in the longer term, not least for the mobility of 
teachers between schools (and, therefore for the efficiency of future teacher supply to 
schools). If schools serving disadvantaged localities do not receive a fair share of 
school-led training places, then the difficulties these schools experience in securing 
teachers will be magnified.  
Problems may also arise in the longer term if school-led training strengthens an 
apprenticeship ethos and weakens a broad professional ethos in teaching. Completion of 
an apprenticeship may encourage a sense of having completed learning to become a 
teacher. Lifelong learning in teaching is more easily associated with an occupational 
professionalism model (Matthews, 1991) in which teachers are expected to develop a 
deep understanding of processes of learning and teaching and contingency of effective 
practice on circumstance.  The PSTs interviewed in this case study claimed they were 
rarely encouraged to consider the theoretical and evidence bases for the practices that 
they were expected to adopt. Moreover, if school-led ITE enculturates new teachers in 
adherence to organisational norms rather than serving society then motivation to 
recognise and do something about issues affecting children’s education may be 
diminished. Both these factors would undermine hopes for ‘school-led system 
improvement’ in the longer term. Of course, if earlier reforms had ? already embedded 
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an apprenticeship model (Wright and Bottery, 1997) then it might have been too late 
anyway. 
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